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ChaNge aNd CoNTINUITY IN FrINge beNeFIT TaxaTIoN: SeekINg SeNSe aNd SeNSIbILITY
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 One of the most central issues in the income taxation of individuals is the treatment 
of so-called “fringe benefits.” This loosely defined phrase includes everything from 
employer-provided health insurance to discounts on an employer’s products to retirement 
planning services funded by one’s present employer. Indeed, the most recent Employer’s 
Guide to this subject from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) includes the following 
examples: health benefits, achievement awards, adoption assistance, athletic facilities, 
dependent care assistance, educational assistance, employee discounts, employee stock 
options, employer-provided cell phones, group-term life insurance coverage, lodging on 
employer business premises, meals, moving expense reimbursements, no-additional-cost 
services, retirement planning services, transportation (commuting) benefits, tuition 
reduction, and working condition benefits.1
 The basic allure of fringe benefits results from a fundamental discrepancy in 
their tax treatment vis-à-vis wages and other cash compensation. Wages are included 
in the taxable income of employees and are deductible as a business expense by 
employers. While the cost of providing fringe benefits is similarly deductible by 
employers, the value of such benefits is often excluded from the taxable income of 
employees.2 This anomalous result persists despite the explicit inclusion of “fringe 
benefits” in the Internal Revenue Code’s (IRC) foundational definition of gross 
income3 because various exceptions have been created for reasons ranging from 
avoiding wartime limits on compensation to encouraging energy conservation.4 As a 
result of this disparate tax treatment, fringe benefits have increased in both popularity 
and cost, and today represent a much larger proportion of employee compensation 
than was the case a half century ago.5
 This phenomenon of excluding certain fringe benefits from taxation raises several 
distinct issues for tax reform generally and for understanding the metastatic profusion 
of tax administrative complexity specifically. One such issue is cost. The exclusion of 
fringe benefits from employees’ income reduced federal income tax revenues by 
nearly $381 billion in fiscal year 2011, representing more than a third of the forgone 
tax revenues that are often described as “tax expenditures.”6 Moreover, many of these 
fringe benefit exclusions carry over to the definition of income that state governments 
1. Employer’s Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits: For Use in 2014, Internal Revenue Serv. 5 (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 106 (Westlaw 2010); id. § 119 (Westlaw 1998); id. § 132 (Westlaw 2013).
3. Id. § 61(a)(1) (Westlaw 1984).
4. See, e.g., id. § 132(f)(1)(A), (B), (D), (f)(5)(A), (B), (F); see also Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and 
Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the President, 2 U.S. Dep’t Treasury 1, 36 
(1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/taxpolicy/Documents/tres84v2All.pdf.
5. See Ken McDonnell, Finances of Employee Benefits: Health Costs Drive Changing Trends, 26 Emp. 
Benefits Res. Inst. Notes 2, 2–3 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_
Notes_12-20055.pdf.
6. Facts from EBRI, Tax Expenditures and Employee Benefits: Estimates from the FY 2011 Budget, Emp. 
Benefits Res. Inst. 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/FS-209_
Mar10_Bens-Rev-Loss.pdf.
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employ in determining their own income tax base.7 Furthermore, many fringe benefit 
exclusions, including employer-provided health insurance,8 also apply well to Social 
Security’s definition of wages,9 thereby reducing tax receipts for that program—an 
issue of increasing importance as the Baby Boom generation begins to claim 
retirement benefits.
 Another major issue that fringe benefit treatment necessarily implicates is 
fairness. Some fringe benefits tend to be widely available to employees of varying 
economic status.10 But others, such as first-class air transportation, are generally 
concentrated among the economic elite within any given business organization.11 In 
other cases, a particular fringe benefit—say, food and lodging provided for the 
convenience of the employer—manifests itself very differently in different contexts. 
Few taxpayers find anything untoward, for example, when McDonald’s workers are 
able to consume their McWhatevers at work without owing any McTax on their 
value, but well-paid art museum directors living rent-free in high-priced housing is 
another matter entirely. Perhaps that is why The New York Times deemed it 
newsworthy in 2010 to report that the president of the American Museum of Natural 
History owed no income tax on her rent-free use of a $5 million apartment the 
museum purchased when she was hired.12 Similar arrangements applied to the 
director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s $4 million co-operative apartment 
and the director of the Museum of Modern Art’s $6 million condominium.13
 Another fundamental issue raised by the exclusion of fringe benefits from taxation 
is economic efficiency. Goods and services provided as excludable fringes are worth 
more to employees than taxable forms of compensation because no tax is owed on 
those goods and services.14 This absence of tax cost increases the appeal of non-cash 
7. Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and 
Materials 888 (7th ed. 2001) (“Most state personal income taxes conform closely to the federal 
personal income tax.”).
8. I.R.C. § 106 (Westlaw 2010); id. § 3121(a)(2) (Westlaw 2008).
9. Compare id. § 3121(a), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 409 (Westlaw 2008). See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the 
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 685, 702–03 (2002).
10. See Susan R. Finneran, Fringe Benefit or “Condition of Employment”: Uniformity, Certainty, and 
Compliance, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 198, 198–99 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Christopher Falkenberg & Shira Zatcoff, Employer-Provided Security and the Independent 
Security Study, 112 Tax Notes 583, 583 (2006) (“Many corporations provide their senior executives 
with cars, drivers, and access to private aircraft.”).
12. Kevin Flynn & Stephanie Strom, Fine Perk for Museum Chiefs: Luxury Housing (It’s Tax-Free), N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 10, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EEDF1330F933A2575B
C0A9669D8B63. See generally Jane Zhao, Nights on the Museum: Should Free Housing Provided to Museum 
Directors Also Be Tax-Free?, 62 Syracuse L. Rev. 427 (2012).
13. Flynn & Strom, supra note 12.
14. See Robert W. Turner, A Variety of Forms of Compensation that are Not Taxed, in NTA Encyclopedia of 
Tax’n & Tax Pol’y 159, 160–61 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005), available at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Fringe-Benefits.cfm.
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compensation,15 incentivizing employees to prefer such benefits even when they might 
not do so otherwise. If all forms of compensation were taxed equally, many employees 
would likely reject fringe benefits in favor of cash income over which they would have 
greater control. They could then purchase the goods and services they prefer at prices 
that would more accurately reflect the demand for them.16 In this manner, excluding 
fringe benefits from taxation reduces tax neutrality and creates economic inefficiency.17
 This article examines the expansion of excludible fringe benefits that has 
characterized the long history of the federal income tax with a view to returning to 
first principles of general income inclusion, as propounded in § 61. However, full 
taxation of all fringe benefits glosses over important distinctions. Accordingly, the 
ultimate goal is to distinguish between fringe benefits that employers provide primarily 
for their own business purposes, which are appropriately excluded from an employee’s 
taxable income, and fringe benefits that substitute for essentially personal expenditures 
made by an employer on an employee’s behalf, which should not be so excluded.
 Part II of this article examines the history of fringe benefits and the IRS’s 
struggle to create a consistent framework for analyzing fringe benefit exclusions. Part 
II also demonstrates that the present confusion pervading the fringe benefit area is 
largely due to the use of varying theories and justifications for excluding fringe 
benefits that make no pretense of advancing historical tax policy objectives and are 
often outdated as well. Part III proposes a more straightforward framework to apply 
to existing and future fringe benefits by arguing that fringe benefits should be 
excluded from taxation only if they are necessary for employees to complete their 
duties or are required for closely calibrated administrability concerns. This framework 
is then applied to the more significant fringe benefit exclusions of the present IRC.
ii. histOriCaL dEVELOpMEnt Of fringE bEnEfit EXCLUsiOn
 A. Pre-Statutory Administrative Determinations
 The term “fringe benefit” did not appear in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 
until 1961,18 but the concept of excluding certain employer-provided benefits from 
gross income has existed since the earliest days of the federal income tax. The 
Revenue Act of 1913 (“Revenue Act”) provided that taxable net income “shall include 
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal 
service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid  .  .  . also from interest, rent, 
dividends, securities  .  .  . or gains or profits and income derived from any source 
15. See id.; see also Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the Tax 
Code, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 62, 62 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad Policy, 
34 Ind. L. Rev. 395, 399 (2001).
17. See generally Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to 
the President, 1 U.S. Dep’t Treasury 1, 13 (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
taxpolicy/Documents/tres84v1All.pdf.
18. Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 977, 
981 n.14 (2006).
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whatever.”19 Despite the broad scope of this language, the IRS quickly began creating 
nonstatutory exclusions to this provision. By 1921, the IRS had issued administrative 
decisions excluding from taxable income certain employer-provided meals and 
lodging,20 employee death benefits,21 group-term life insurance payments,22 and rail 
passes provided to off-duty railroad employees and their families.23
 Inconsistent application of these exclusions quickly turned fringe benefits into an 
area of immense confusion and escalating complexity.24 With little available in terms of 
concrete rules, the IRS made subsequent exclusion decisions based on analogy, custom, 
and so-called “common sense.”25 Reliance on these techniques resulted in a gradual 
broadening of fringe benefit exclusions, a result inconsistent with the Revenue Act’s 
general purpose of collecting income from “any source whatever.”26 This process is 
illustrated in the following specific contexts: meals and lodging, health and accident 
insurance, group-term life insurance, transportation passes, and holiday gifts.
  1. Convenience of the Employer: Meals and Lodging
 The IRS’s original justification for excluding fringe benefits was premised on an 
understanding that when an employee was required to accept benefits to fulfill his 
duties, that employee was not actually being compensated for services but was simply 
accommodating the employer.27 This rationale came to be known as the “convenience 
of the employer” doctrine.28 Many early applications of the doctrine involved employer-
provided meals and lodgings,29 but the IRS often sought to justify other benefits based 
on a similar connection to a taxpayer’s employment.30
 The first reference to the convenience of the employer doctrine occurred in a 
1919 IRS decision, which provided that “[b]oard and lodging furnished to seamen in 
addition to their cash compensation is held to be supplied for the convenience of the 
employer.”31 The value of these benefits was excluded from the taxpayer’s income.32 
19. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
20. O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71; O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.
21. See Karla W. Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform: Historical Blunders and a Proposal for Structural 
Change, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 871, 889 (1984).
22. T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76.
23. O.D. 946, 1921-4 C.B. 110.
24. Simon, supra note 21, at 879.
25. Gazur, supra note 18, at 982; see also Simon, supra note 21, at 879.
26. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; Simon, supra note 21, at 879.
27. Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85 (1977); Simon, supra note 21, at 897.
28. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 84.
29. See, e.g., O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
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While not explicitly referencing the doctrine by name, a second 1919 IRS decision 
held that maintenance payments provided to Red Cross workers were taxable to the 
extent that they exceeded the workers’ actual living expenses.33
 At the time these rulings were promulgated, nothing in the statutory definition 
of taxable income indicated that benefits provided for the convenience of the employer 
were exempt from taxation.34 Nonetheless, these early determinations showed that 
the IRS was not prepared to classify every employer-provided benefit as taxable 
income. Some commentators subsequently suggested that these rulings were based 
on an assumption that the employees “had to be present where they were, not because 
they desired it but rather because there was no other way that the duties could be 
performed.”35 If the benefits provided to these taxpayers were necessary for them to 
perform their duties, the IRS likely considered the benefits to be no more than tools 
of the trade, rather than compensation as such.
 In 1920, the IRS modified the existing tax regulations to reflect the creation of 
the doctrine, providing that:
When living quarters such as camps are furnished to employees for the 
convenience of the employer, the ratable value need not be added to the cash 
compensation of the employee, but where a person receives as compensation 
for services rendered a salary and in addition thereto living quarters, the value 
to such person of the quarters furnished constitutes income subject to tax.36
That same year, the IRS expanded the convenience of the employer exclusion by ruling 
that “supper money” provided to an employee working overtime hours “is considered as 
being paid for the convenience of the employer and for that reason does not represent 
taxable income to the employee.”37 Two additional facts from the supper money 
determination are worth mentioning. First, the ruling addressed an employee “who 
voluntarily performs extra labor for his employer.”38 Second, the exclusion was not 
applied to actual in-kind benefits, but to cash given for a purportedly noncompensatory 
purpose.39
 Unsurprisingly, the IRS had a difficult time reconciling the differences between 
these early decisions. The voluntary nature of overtime labor in the supper money 
decision seems distinguishable from the factual scenarios presented in the 1919 
decisions. In the seamen decision, the employee was provided in-kind benefits and, 
based on the nature of his duties, was required to be on the ship to perform his 
33. O.D. 11, 1919-1 C.B. 66.
34. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law 
in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 842–43 (2012).
35. Simon, supra note 21, at 897.
36. T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76.
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work.40 Voluntarily performing extra labor, when an employee is presumably free to 
reject working the extra hours, is hardly comparable to being forced to remain on a 
ship to complete one’s duties. If the 1919 rulings were based on an understanding 
that employer-provided benefits were necessary for the employees to complete their 
duties, it was unclear how excess voluntary labor fits into this framework.
 Convenience of the employer determinations expanded in 1920, but the IRS drew 
no clear line between the seemingly distinct seamen and supper money decisions. 
Rulings issued in 1921 further extended the doctrine to camp lodgings provided to 
employees of the Indian Service (presently, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs) so 
long as it did not consider the right to use the lodging as part of the employees’ 
compensation,41 and to employees engaged in the fish canning industry “[w]here, from 
the location and nature of the work, it is necessary that employees engaged in fishing 
and canning be furnished with lodging and sustenance by the employer.”42
 The divergent readings of the IRS’s determinations resulted in the development 
of two variations of the convenience of the employer doctrine: the “employer-
characterization” model and the “business-necessity” model. The employer- 
characterization model focused on whether the employer intended the benefit to be 
considered compensation and ref lected the supper money exclusion.43 In Jones v. 
United States, the court relied on this variation of the doctrine in holding that neither 
the value of lodgings provided to an army officer nor a cash commutation for 
subsistence provided in lieu of lodgings constituted taxable income.44 The Jones court 
based its holding on “custom,” noting that congressionally appropriated sums were 
considered distinct from compensation for other state employees (including judges), 
and on the premise that providing lodging to an officer was a military necessity.45
 The alternative model focused on the underlying facts and circumstances of the 
taxpayer’s employment to determine whether the benefit was actually necessary for 
the business to function properly, reflecting the seaman exclusion.46 The business-
necessity model found judicial support in Van Rosen v. Commissioner, a case presenting 
facts similar to Jones but reaching the opposite result.47 Van Rosen was a civilian ship 
captain employed by the army.48 While his ship was being repaired, he was given a 
cash allowance to secure lodging.49 The court held that the cash constituted taxable 
40. See O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
41. O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85.
42. O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84–85. 
43. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–85 (1977).
44. 60 Ct. Cl. 552, 567–68 (1925).
45. Id.
46. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 85; O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
47. See 17 T.C. 834, 837 (1951).
48. Id. at 834.
49. Id. at 835.
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income because the benefit was not necessary for Van Rosen to perform his duties as 
a ship captain.50
 Additional cases and IRS publications in the 1950s did little to reduce taxpayer 
confusion.51 In light of these conflicting doctrines and decisions, Congress enacted 
§ 119 to establish when meals and lodging furnished by an employer can be excluded 
from an employee’s taxable income.52 This provision embraced the business-necessity 
model as the statutory convenience of the employer test.53 To eliminate any residual 
doubts, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively interpreted § 119 as embracing this 
view in Commissioner v. Kowalski.54
  2. Health and Accident Insurance
 A similar pattern of IRS pronouncement, followed by statutory codification, 
characterizes one of the most costly and most controversial fringe benefits—namely, 
employer-provided health and accident insurance for employees. In this circumstance, 
there was no effort to cast this exclusion as something provided for the employer’s 
convenience, at least as that concept had been understood to that point. Instead, the 
origin of this benefit relates to World War II and the then-typical pattern of wartime-
induced wage and price inf lation.55 With large numbers of workers taken off the 
employment rolls to implement the war effort, those workers who remained available 
for employment were in short supply and employers felt the need to increase wages in 
light of the changed supply-and-demand dynamics.56
 To prevent such wage increases, the U.S. government limited employers’ ability 
to raise workers’ wages to reflect the new employment realities.57 Since wage increases 
were thus limited, some employers began to provide health and accident insurance to 
their employees.58 In what would become an incredibly pivotal decision for U.S. 
health care, and for the American economy more generally, the federal government 
went along with this rather transparent effort to evade the wage restrictions it had 
imposed. To be sure, health insurance at that time was a relatively novel concept and 
was fairly inexpensive. In any case, the IRS subsequently ruled that employees did 
50. Id. at 838.
51. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 84 (discussing the history of the convenience of the employer doctrine).
52. Id. at 90–91 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at 18 (1954), S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 19 (1954), reprinted in 
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4649).
53. Id. at 93.
54. Id. The Kowalski Court held that cash reimbursements paid to state highway patrol officers for lunches 
while on duty were not excludible as meals provided by an employer. Id. at 95.
55. See  History  of  Health  Insurance  Benefits,  Emp. Benefit  Res. Inst. (Mar. 2002), http://www.ebri.org/
publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact.
56. Id.
57. See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications, 
355 New Eng. J. Med. 82, 83 (2006).
58. Id.
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not need to include the value of health insurance premiums paid by their employers 
in their taxable income.59
 Nearly a decade after World War II, Congress codified this determination in 
§ 106, which provides that gross income “does not include employer-provided 
coverage under an accident or health plan.”60 Although the full ramifications of this 
provision are beyond the scope of this article, this seemingly innocuous fringe benefit 
tax exclusion led to the development of more comprehensive health insurance. After 
all, the increased cost of health insurance that covers every check-up and influenza 
vaccination receives tax-favored treatment when compared to increased wages that 
would otherwise pay for such costs.61 Furthermore, the tax-favored treatment of 
employer-provided health insurance led directly to the pervasive practice of U.S. 
employees looking to their employers for health insurance62—a phenomenon that is 
largely unique among developed economies.63 Not until the implementation of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,64 or ObamaCare, had any significant 
effort been made to sever the connection between employment and health 
insurance—a connection with far-reaching consequences for both domains.
  3. Group-Term Life Insurance
 The IRS’s early struggles to consistently apply a clearly defined test for the 
convenience of the employer doctrine extended beyond meals and lodging into an 
area that seems completely unrelated—namely, group-term life insurance. When the 
IRS first considered the tax consequences of employer-provided group-term life 
insurance premiums, it concluded that these payments were deductible for the 
employer and taxable income for the employee.65 This conclusion was based on an 
understanding that reasonable premiums are “clearly a legitimate expense of the 
corporation, being in the nature of additional compensation to the employees.”66
 In a 1920 Solicitor’s Law Opinion, the IRS changed positions, establishing that 
employer-provided group-term life insurance was not part of an employee’s taxable 
59. Special Ruling, 433 Standard Fed. Tax Serv. (CCH), ¶ 6587 (Nov. 24, 1943).
60. I.R.C. § 106(a) (Westlaw 2010).
61. See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of 
American Health Care, 36 McGeorge L. Rev. 535, 546–47 (2005).
62. Id. at 538–39.
63. See Karen Davis, Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs—Learning from International Experience, 359 
New Eng. J. Med. 1751, 1751 (2008) (“The United States spends twice per capita what other major 
industrialized countries spend on health care but is the only one that fails to provide near-universal 
health insurance coverage.”). See generally Robert Kuttner, Market-Based Failure—A Second Opinion on 
U.S. Health Care Costs, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 549 (2008).
64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
65. O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88.
66. Id.
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income.67 The IRS concluded that the only benefit an employee received under the 
plan was “the feeling of contentment that provision has been made for dependents,” 
as the dependents were the only ones to receive the monetary benefits of the plan.68 
Interestingly, the IRS concluded that the payments were deductible to the corporation 
as an “ordinary and necessary expense[]” because premiums are not compensation to 
the employee “but an investment in increased efficiency” that lasts only while the 
employee is employed.69 Although premiums for group-term life insurance thus 
received favorable tax treatment, premiums for individual and group-permanent life 
insurance did not.70
 This position continued until it was codified in § 79 by the Revenue Act of 
1964.71 In drafting § 79, Congress recognized the inequitable effect of excluding 
group-term life insurance premiums while taxing premiums paid for other insurance 
policies.72 Congress further rejected the IRS’s rationale for the exclusion, noting that 
“the employee  .  .  . receives a substantial economic benefit from this insurance 
protection whether or not the policy for a specific year leads to a payment to his 
beneficiary.”73 Nonetheless, § 79 continues to exclude from taxation the cost of any 
group-term life insurance provided by an employer to the extent that the face value 
of such insurance does not exceed $50,000.74 The cost of any insurance over this 
threshold is taxable to the employee.75
 This peculiarly Solomonic resolution elides the notion that this fringe benefit has 
any significant business rationale to the employer providing such insurance, especially 
since the $50,000 threshold has not been adjusted for inflation in the half century 
since its enactment.76 Indeed, many employees are unaware that this provision even 
exists until they find additional income in their end-of-year tax statement representing 
the employer’s premium cost for life insurance exceeding the $50,000 threshold. To 
be sure, this insurance is not permanent and often ends when a worker’s employment 
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 89; see also Lee v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 225, 229 (W.D.S.C. 1963) (distinguishing group-
term life insurance premiums from individual plans and noting that the former are an investment in 
increased employee efficiency).
70. Lee, 219 F. Supp. at 229.
71. Simon, supra note 21, at 905.
72. H.R. Rep. No. 88-749, pt. 2, at 1030 (1963).
73. Id. at 1064.
74. I.R.C. § 79(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
75. Id.
76. Using the Consumer Price Index from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
$50,000 threshold would be approximately $376,000 adjusted through November 2013. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, C.P.I. Inflation Calculator, Bureau Lab. Stat., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2015).
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terminates,77 but until then, an employee can designate who will receive the insurance 
proceeds upon the employee’s death.78 In other words, such insurance functions just 
like term insurance that an employee might purchase on own initiative.
  4. Transportation Passes and Holiday “Gifts”
 Beyond the convenience of the employer doctrine, certain employer-provided 
fringe benefits were excluded by the IRS on the rationale that they constituted gifts. 
The concept of a “gift” in the early days of the IRC was more expansive before the 
1986 statutory amendment declaring that gifts do not include “any amount transferred 
by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.”79
 In 1921, the IRS held that personal transportation passes provided to railroad 
employees and their families were considered gifts when not required in the 
employment contract.80 Nearly sixty years later, the tax court observed that treating 
free railroad passes as anything other than additional compensation is “out of touch 
with reality,”81 but the gift/compensation distinction has had strong traction with 
taxpayers. Indeed, the railroad ruling would later be invoked to justify excluding free 
airplane tickets provided to airline employees.82 The IRS continued to allow this 
exclusion even after the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the definition of a gift83 in 
Commissioner v. Duberstein.84
 In 1959, the IRS ruled that the value of a Christmas turkey, ham, or other 
merchandise of similar nominal value would not constitute income or be subject to 
wage withholding if the gifts were part of a general distribution to employees to 
promote goodwill.85 Similar to the rationale in the original group-term life insurance 
exclusion, the IRS held that the value of these items was deductible as an ordinary 
and necessary business expense if distributed primarily for the business purpose of 
promoting good relations among employees.86 Although the IRS paid particular 
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b) (Westlaw 2005) (providing that group-term life insurance may not provide a 
“permanent benefit”).
78. Lauren Bikoff et al., U.S. Master Employee Benefits Guide 504 (2013 ed. 2013).
79. I.R.C. § 102(c)(1) (Westlaw 1986) (originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 
§ 122(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2110).
80. O.D. 946, 1921-4 C.B. 110 (“Personal transportation passes issued by a railroad company to its 
employees and their families, to be used when not engaged on business for the company, and which are 
not provided for in the contracts of employment, are considered gifts and the value thereof does not 
constitute taxable income to the employees.”).
81. Zelenak, supra note 34, at 843; see Zager v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1009, 1014 n.3 (1979), action on dec., 1980-
67 (Dec. 19, 1979), aff ’d sub nom. Martin v. Comm’r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. Zager, 72 T.C. at 1013–14; see Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification 
of Historical Inequities, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 425, 429 (1985).
83. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 429.
84. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
85. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
86. Id.
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attention to the small amounts involved and the gift-like nature of the items, it was 
careful to note that its ruling would not apply to “cash, gift certificates, and similar 
items of readily convertible cash value, regardless of the amount involved.”87
 After articulating this clear and unambiguous limit on the tax treatment of non-
cash holiday gifts, holiday gifts in the form of $25 and $15 gift cards were excluded 
in Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. United States.88 In the spirit of Christmas, the court held 
that the clear intention of the company was to provide gifts to its employees.89 The 
court reasoned that the gift cards were no more than a means of promoting goodwill 
among employees because they were relatively small in value and not readily 
convertible into cash.90
 Similarly, in Zager v. Commissioner, employer discounts provided to retail employees 
were considered exempt from gross income on the same rationale.91 The Zager court 
noted that these discounts “have traditionally been treated as non-taxable, 
notwithstanding the familiar and oft-repeated statement that in considering what is to 
be included in gross income Congress intended to use its power to the full extent.”92 It 
appears that the IRS analogized this position from its earlier holiday cases, excluding 
the discount from gross income when it was of a relatively small value provided to 
promote employee health, goodwill, or efficiency.93
 B. The Reforms of 1984
 Even after Congress began codifying fringe benefit provisions in 1954, a large 
number of nonstatutory fringe benefits continued to exist. Recognizing the confusion 
generated from six decades of inconsistent rulings, the IRS felt that better guidance 
was required for the treatment of nonstatutory fringe benefits. During 1975 and 
1976, the IRS attempted to end confusion by formally recognizing certain 
nonstatutory fringe benefits.94 But this effort met considerable criticism,95 and 
Congress then enacted legislation to prohibit the issuance of final regulations relating 
to fringe benefits96 while it sought to formulate the best way to treat these exclusions.97 
87. Id.
88. 200 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 72 T.C. 1009, 1013–14 (1979).
92. Id.
93. Gazur, supra note 18, at 985.
94. Shaller, supra note 82, at 429–30.
95. Id.
96. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1(a), 92 Stat. 996, 996.
97. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, at 286 (1983), reprinted in Bernard D. Reams, Jr., 3 Tax Reform 1984: A 
Legislative History of the Tax Reform Act of 1984: The Law, Reports, Hearings, Debates 
and Related Documents 3 (1985) [hereinafter Tax Reform History].
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 Thirty years ago, Congress enacted its solution in the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984.98 Section 132 was designed to simplify the IRC, prevent tax benefits from 
causing distortions in economic behavior, and improve the fairness and efficiency of 
the tax system.99 To that end, Congress fashioned four general categories of tax-free 
fringe benefits, but without any consistent underlying rationale. These categories are 
now described briefly and then evaluated, after which, subsequently added exclusions 
will be considered.
  1. General Fringe Benefit Exclusions
 One such category excludes benefits for which the employer incurs no “substantial 
additional cost,”100 and the classic examples include using an otherwise empty hotel 
room or f lying in an otherwise unoccupied airline seat.101 A second general category 
covers employee discounts within stipulated limits—namely, the gross profit 
percentage for goods102 and 20% for services.103 Interestingly, these two fringe benefit 
categories are subject to a nondiscrimination rule that precludes the application of 
these exclusions to “highly compensated employees” unless the particular exclusion is 
available “on substantially the same terms” to a broadly defined classification of 
employees.104 The details implementing this rule are set forth in the Treasury 
Regulations (“Regulations”),105 but the main point here is that this requirement 
explicitly recognizes the importance of fairness issues in the fringe benefit area, as 
noted earlier in this article.106
 The other two general categories—namely, working condition and de minimis 
benefits—speak directly to how fringe benefit exclusions often originated and to their 
appropriate scope according to this article. Working condition fringes are benefits “that, 
if the employee paid for [them], such payment would be allowable as a [trade or business] 
deduction.”107 Benefits excludable under this provision include “property or services [that] 
reasonably can be expected to occur in connection with the employee’s performance.”108 
98. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 877–81 (adding I.R.C. § 132).
99. Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 42.
100. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-2(a)(2) (Westlaw 1989).
102. I.R.C. § 132(a)(2), (c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
103. Id. § 132(c)(1)(B).
104. Id. § 132(j)(1).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(a)(i)–(ii) (Westlaw 1989).
106. Finneran, supra note 10, at 199 n.11.
107. I.R.C. § 132(d).
108. Rules for the Federal Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits: Hearing on H.R. 3525 Before the Subcommittee on 
Select Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 60 (1983), reprinted in 
Bernard Reams, Jr., 11 Tax Reform 1984: A Legislative History of the Tax Reform Act of 
1984: The Law, Reports, Hearings, Debates and Related Documents (1985) (explaining H.R. 
3525’s working condition fringe definition).
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Receipts of cash payments by an employer must be verified with adequate records,109 and 
any amount unspent must be returned to the employer.110
 Although the working condition fringe benefit exclusion does not employ the 
convenience of the employer rubric, it embodies a correlative notion of business-
necessity by incorporating the “ordinary and necessary” standards that § 162 requires 
for the deduction of “trade or business” expenses.111 In effect, this exclusion recognizes 
that if an employer provides a benefit that the employee could otherwise deduct, the 
cleanest administrative approach is to ignore the transaction entirely.112 Despite this 
approach, some benefits—such as employer-provided outplacement counseling113 and 
voluntary employee fishing trips114—have been excluded under this provision.
 The exclusion for de minimis fringe benefits is unassailably sensible. The law 
should not bother with “any property or service the value of which is (after taking 
into account the frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the employer 
to the employer’s employees) so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or 
administratively impracticable.”115 Classic examples include free “coffee, doughnuts, 
and soft drinks.”116 With that being said, the current Regulations exclude certain 
benefits such as “occasional personal use of an employer’s copying machine”117 that 
could easily be rendered accountable using modern technology.118
  2. Evaluating the General Fringe Benefit Exclusions
 Congress justified the preferential tax treatment of these fringe benefits by relying 
on custom, administrative difficulties, and legitimate noncompensatory business 
purposes.119 The House Report on the Deficit Reduction Act states that free 
transportation passes and employee discounts were “long established” and had been 
relied upon by taxpayers and the IRS for some time.120 Administrative difficulties in 
keeping track of employee discounts and no-additional-cost services were also cited to 
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v)(B) (Westlaw 2010).
110. Id. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v)(C).
111. I.R.C. § 162(a) (Westlaw 2011).
112. Gazur, supra note 18, at 1013.
113. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51.
114. See Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 2003).
115. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (Westlaw 1992).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Xerox Job Tracking Captures Data for Office Print Tracking, Xerox, http://www.consulting.xerox.
com/print-tracking/enus.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
119. See Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 286.
120. See id.
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justify exclusion,121 especially for airline passes.122 Additionally, Congress felt there was 
a legitimate, noncompensatory business purpose justifying the qualified employee 
discount and no-additional-cost service provisions. 123 By way of example, the 
Committee Reports provided that “a retail clothing business will want its salespersons 
to wear, when they deal with customers, the clothing which it seeks to sell to the 
public.”124 To some congressional leaders, exclusions of travel passes to airline employees 
and discounts to retail employees were considered two of the “most important 
[exclusions] to many working taxpayers.”125 It is unclear who these “working taxpayers” 
might be outside of the retail and airline industries.
 Congress’s attempt to justify these exclusions through a business purpose is 
reminiscent of the IRS’s early efforts to justify administrative exclusions based on 
employer convenience.126 Applying different tests for employer convenience led to 
inconsistent rulings that ultimately forced congressional intervention to reconcile the 
discrepancies.127 The business purpose articulated here is also reminiscent of the 
“increased efficiency” rationale offered by the IRS in its initial exclusion of group-term 
life insurance.128 But, unlike traditional convenience of the employer determinations, 
these exclusions are not necessary for an employer’s business to function.129
 The administrative difficulties of reporting employee discounts and no-additional-
cost services are also suspect. Even assuming that the recordkeeping burden is too 
onerous for these benefits to be taxable—which is not a convincing argument given 
the IRS’s ability to value prize money and gratuitous tips130—administrative concerns 
do not justify broadening the definition of an employee to include his parents, as is 
the case with airline passes.131
  3. Subsequently Added Exclusions
 Section 132 has subsequently been amended to exclude additional benefits that are 
even further afield from whatever rationale the 1984 reforms sought to implement.132 
Less than a decade after those reforms were enacted, Congress decided to increase the 
United States’ environmental consciousness by creating fringe benefit exclusions for 
121. Shaller, supra note 82, at 430–31.
122. Id. at 436.
123. See Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 286.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1308.
126. See, e.g., O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84; O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 71–90.
128. O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88–89.
129. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 428.
130. See id. at 436–38.
131. I.R.C. § 132(h)(3) (Westlaw 2013).
132. See generally id. § 132 (originally enacted as Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494).
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employer-provided mass transit passes, employer-run commuter vehicles, and parking 
near an employer’s premises133—even though subsidizing such parking would seem to 
undercut efforts to reduce energy consumption.134 Nearly a decade after those additions 
were made, employer-provided retirement planning services were added to the list of 
exclusions,135 although the nondiscrimination rule that previously was restricted to 
no-additional-cost services and employee discounts was extended to this particular 
benefit.136 The most recent addition to this increasingly diverse collection of provisions 
was added to assist those Americans who are affected by the closing of military bases.137 
As a result, the barely coherent scheme of § 132 has become less so due to subsequent 
legislative additions.
iii. rEthinKing thE EXCLUsiOn Of fringE bEnEfits
 The tax reform effort of thirty years ago was not an effective temporizing solution. 
It provided few convincing reasons for taxing some fringe benefits and not others, and 
it failed to stem the proliferation of additional exclusions. It is time for a different 
approach to this perennial problem. It is time to take seriously the IRC’s imperative to 
tax compensation regardless of the form it takes, including most fringe benefits.138
 Despite the enormous changes that have taken place during the century of the 
federal income tax law’s existence, the IRS’s original effort to distinguish between 
business-necessitated benefits that facilitate the enterprise of the employer and benefits 
that substitute for wages remains sound. Accordingly, a comprehensive effort should be 
undertaken to draw this line of demarcation as clearly as possible without regard to 
historic “custom” and similar theoretical shortcuts. In this regard, the IRS’s 1984 
approach should be renewed and applied with a presumption that all fringe benefits are 
taxable unless they predominantly benefit the employer or are necessary to avoid 
onerous recordkeeping. In other words, exclusions should be limited to those fringe 
benefits that are necessary to complete employment tasks in line with the original 
personal/employer-necessity distinction drawn by the IRS.139
 Under this framework, primarily personal benefits would be included in income 
while benefits that are necessary for an employee to complete an employer’s task are 
excludable. Factors such as the value of the provided good or service and whether 
readily available noncompensatory alternatives exist to accomplish the employer’s 
133. Id. § 132(f)(1), amended by Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b), 106 Stat. 2776, 
3012–13.
134. See generally Jennifer L. Shoulberg, Pedaling Toward a More Equitable Tax-Ride for Cyclists, 55 St. Louis 
U. L.J. 423 (2010).
135. I.R.C. § 132(m)(1), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 665(b), 115 Stat. 38, 143.
136. Id. § 132(m)(2).
137. Id. § 132(n)(1), amended by Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 103(b), 117 
Stat. 1335, 1337–38.
138. See generally id. § 132.
139. See, e.g., O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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goals should be considered in making this determination. An employer’s assessment 
that a particular benefit is necessary would not be controlling, and each case would 
require an objective analysis of the underlying facts and circumstances.140 De minimis 
items that are legitimately too difficult to administer would continue to be excluded.
 The results of this approach would be more equitable and more efficient than the 
current model, which eliminates nearly all of the fringe benefit exclusions that are 
currently available. Eliminating these exclusions would simplify the IRC, further 
easing the cost of taxpayer compliance. Applications of this approach to the fringe 
benefits previously described now follow, beginning with health and accident 
insurance, group-term life insurance, the specific exclusions of § 132, and finally, 
meals and lodging.
 A. Health and Accident Insurance
 Tackling first the biggest elephant in the proverbial room, there is no inherent 
reason for employer-provided health and accident insurance to be a tax-free fringe 
benefit. Other than the obvious reality that employers need healthy workers, health 
insurance is about as personal a benefit as one can imagine. The idea that employers 
should design policy options and alternatives for a diverse workforce that has little in 
common beyond their source of employment is both wrong-headed and dangerous.141 
Employees may be single or married, healthy or not quite so healthy, smokers, 
exercisers, food addicts, drug abusers, etc. These characteristics, and many others, 
play important roles in determining the most appropriate health insurance that an 
employee might prefer. The employer is not in the best position to assess the varying 
preferences of its employees and would not have accepted this burden but for a policy 
developed over seventy years ago to avoid wartime constraints on allowable pay 
increases.142 No other developed economy assigns such a major role to employers in 
securing health insurance coverage for its citizens. That an employer’s highest 
prerogative in this context is cost minimization further underscores the poor fit that 
health insurance has as a tax-free fringe benefit. On the proposed divide between 
business-necessity and personal-expenditure surrogate, health insurance clearly falls 
within the personal-expenditure category.
 Though this article is about tax policy, a proposal to end the exclusion for health 
insurance necessarily requires some non-tax exposition. It is worth noting, for 
example, that eliminating the exclusion for health insurance would have additional 
salutary benefits in dissolving the tie between employment and health insurance. 
Losing one’s job would no longer mean losing one’s health insurance as well.
 Another salutary benefit would be ending “job lock,” the phenomenon whereby 
employees may stay with an employer longer than they would otherwise because they 
140. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 670 F.2d 167, 169, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (quoting Dole v. Comm’r, 43 
T.C. 697, 706 (1965), aff ’d per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965)).
141. See Kaplan, supra note 61, at 536–37.
142. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
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or their families need the health insurance their employer provides.143 When President 
Obama’s health reform law is fully implemented, employees will be able to secure 
health insurance regardless of health status.144 Indeed, preexisting conditions that 
preclude health insurance coverage have historically been a major benefit of securing 
health insurance through an employer. But if employees can obtain such insurance 
regardless of their medical history, there is less reason to preserve a link between 
employment and health insurance that was never deliberately fashioned.
 Severing the employment-insurance linkage would also eliminate many of the 
intrusive efforts of some employers to monitor employees’ health and personal habits 
regarding diet, exercise, smoking, and other non-work related behaviors.145 If an 
employer pays for health insurance, the employer has a facially legitimate claim to 
knowing about the factors that determine its costs. A fortiori, if health insurance is 
not an employer-provided benefit, these inherently personal aspects of an employee’s 
life should be off-limits to employers. Finally, terminating health insurance as a tax-
free fringe benefit would eliminate the exclusion’s present incentive to have expensive 
first-dollar coverage. Instead, Americans would approach health insurance as they 
do home and automobile insurance: buy insurance to cover large unanticipated 
expenses but pay for smaller, more predictable expenditures directly.146 The present 
tax exclusion encourages the opposite approach by substituting tax-free health 
insurance for taxable compensation. Quite apart from tax policy reasons, the fringe 
benefit exclusion for employer-provided health insurance should be eliminated as 
part of a general rationalization of how Americans finance their health care costs.
 B. Group-Term Life Insurance
 As noted previously, the enactment of § 79 with its unadjusted $50,000 limitation 
dissolved any coherent rationale for excluding employer-provided group-term life 
insurance.147 Such insurance provides almost exclusively personal benefits. It does 
not enhance, let alone facilitate, an employee’s ability to accomplish his assigned 
duties. Life insurance is widely available to the public and many employees, 
particularly those without family responsibilities, who might forgo such coverage if 
their employer did not provide such insurance. Applying the business-necessity 
143. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 Yale J. 
Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 23, 28 (2001).
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3(a) (Westlaw 2011), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010).
145. See, e.g., Howard M. Leichter, “Evil Habits” and “Personal Choices”: Assigning Responsibility for Health in 
the 20th Century, 81 Milbank Q. 603, 609 (2003) (noting that some employers decline to hire smokers 
while others increase cost-sharing for overweight employees); Kris Maher, Companies are Closing Doors 
on Job Applicants Who Smoke, Wall St. J. (Dec. 21, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB110358443336005295.
146. See Kaplan, supra note 61, at 566–67.
147. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
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versus personal framework, group-term life insurance should not be a tax-free fringe 
benefit, even to the limited extent that it is today.
 C. No-Additional-Cost Services and Employee Discounts
 The current exclusions for no-additional-cost services and employee discounts 
should be eliminated as well. These benefits are not necessary for an employee to 
complete his appointed tasks. To think that a retail worker cannot stock shelves, 
check out customers, or otherwise perform his duties without an employee discount 
is preposterous. Similarly, airline employees could continue to maintain airplanes, 
attend to customers, and fly airplanes without off-duty passes for free f lights. Indeed, 
the availability of airline passes to family members,148 including parents of 
employees,149 makes any business-necessity claim laughable on its face. These benefits 
quite simply represent compensation in another form and should be taxed as such. 
Eliminating the present exclusions for them would have the additional administrative 
benefit of no longer needing to apply the inherently ambiguous nondiscrimination 
test150 because that test pertains primarily to the no-additional-cost services and 
employee discount fringe benefit provisions.151
 Despite the airline industry’s original administrative concerns, web-based 
solutions and other services now provide deals on last-minute f lights, which make 
determining the fair market value of these f lights far easier than when the provision 
was first enacted.152 Alternatively, the value of these f lights could be determined in 
the same way as tips or prizes.153 The bottom line is that these benefits no longer 
make sense under either an employer-necessity or administrative rationale.
 D. Working Condition and De Minimis Fringes
 Under an employer’s business-necessity test, working condition fringe benefits 
would continue to be excludible as long as they are necessary for employees to fulfill 
their duties. Business use of company-provided transportation, as well as office 
equipment and other tools of the modern workplace such as cell phones and similar 
items, would therefore experience no change in tax treatment—assuming that 
appropriate documentation of such business use is undertaken. After all, such 
documentation is presently required for businesses to deduct travel and related 
148. I.R.C. § 132(h)(2) (Westlaw 2013).
149. Id. § 132(h)(3). See generally Joel S. Newman, Fly Me, Fly My Mother, 35 Tax Notes 291 (1987), for a 
comprehensive and insightful history of this extension.
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(d) (Westlaw 1989).
151. Id.; I.R.C. § 132(a)(1)–(2), (j)(1).
152. Services like Priceline.com and Expedia claim to offer the best deals on “last minute” airfare by 
comparing the prices of f lights offered across multiple airlines. See, e.g., Priceline.com, http://www.
priceline.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2015); Expedia, http://www.expedia.com/Flights#tab-deals_item_2 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
153. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 436–38.
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costs,154 so this requirement is neither burdensome nor unprecedented. Other 
benefits, such as employer-provided outplacement services and fishing trips, however, 
would not meet the new standard. While these services may be tangentially related 
to employment, they are not necessary for an employee to perform his job. These 
examples show that as long as any fringe benefits are tax-free, the necessity for 
careful line-drawing will not completely disappear—but at least its problematic scope 
can be minimized.
 Similarly, de minimis fringe benefits would continue to be excludible, but only to 
the extent that there are genuine administrative difficulties in accounting for these 
benefits. This article does not propose changing the present statutory de minimis 
standard, but it insists on a stricter application of that standard. Employers should 
not have to bear excessive costs to comply with the IRC, but given the possibility of 
under-the-radar abuse, close monitoring is certainly appropriate. Employers, 
moreover, can always decide that the effort to provide these benefits is not worth the 
hassle and inconvenience, and provide cash remuneration instead.
 Under this article’s framework, the exclusions currently allowed in the Regulations 
for overtime meals, meal money, or local transportation155 would be eliminated. 
Providing cash to employees for these items can easily be accounted for, especially via 
electronic media such as debit cards and similar prepaid mechanisms. Moreover, the 
supper money ruling156 that undergirds the exclusion in the current Regulations 
involved an employee who voluntarily worked overtime. In an era when work hours 
are increasingly f lexible, there is little justification for this exclusion to continue.
 E. Transportation Expenditures and Retirement Planning
 The fringe benefit exclusions for transportation costs and retirement planning 
reflect laudable non-tax policy objectives but have no place in the business-necessity 
approach to this area. These provisions encourage employers to subsidize all types of 
commuting expenses from mass transit157 to special “commuter highway vehicles”158 
that may carry as few as six passengers (excluding the driver)159 to parking for 
individual passenger automobiles “on or near the business premises of the employer.”160 
 Commuting expenses have long been recognized as personal expenditures that 
cannot be deducted161 and are classified as nondeductible “personal, living, or family 
154. I.R.C. § 274(d) (Westlaw 2005).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d)(2) (Westlaw 1992).
156. O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.
157. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(B), (f)(5)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2013).
158. Id. § 132(f)(1)(A), (f)(5)(B).
159. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B)(i). In addition, at least 80% of the mileage of such vehicles must “be reasonably 
expected” to be transporting employees between their homes and their workplace on trips during which 
employees occupy at least half of the “adult seating capacity” of the vehicle. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B)(ii).
160. Id. § 132(f)(1)(C), (f)(5)(C).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (Westlaw 1960).
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expenses.”162 As the applicable Regulations provide, “[t]he taxpayer’s costs of 
commuting to his place of business or employment are personal expenses.”163 In light 
of the inherently personal character of such expenses, the transportation fringe 
benefit provisions should be repealed in their entirety.
 The present exclusion for retirement planning services164 is equally problematic. 
Like transportation costs, expenses for retirement planning are not necessary for an 
employee to complete his duties. Indeed, retirement planning is explicitly about 
leaving the compensated workplace rather than fulfilling one’s responsibilities while 
employed. For that reason alone, this exclusion should be repealed. Moreover, the 
present exclusion limits its benefits to “retirement planning advice or information”165 
and does not include other critical planning services such as “tax preparation, 
accounting, legal, or brokerage services.”166 It is difficult to discern any important 
distinction between the services that may be provided on a tax-favored basis and 
those that may not because all such services are inherently personal and are for the 
benefit of the employee rather than the employer. Furthermore, retirement planning 
is a major growth industry and there is no shortage of willing vendors to provide 
these services to any employee who wants them.167 Inasmuch as these fringe benefits 
clearly substitute for expenditures that employees would make on their own, they 
should be taxable.
 F. Meals and Lodging
 This article ends where it began, with meals and lodging provided for the 
convenience of the employer, as codified in § 119. The proposed fringe benefit 
framework, however, would return this provision to its roots and allow the exclusion 
only when employer-provided meals and lodging are necessary for an employee to 
complete his duties. It would also require more than a “substantial noncompensatory 
business reason” for the provision of meals as articulated in the current Regulations.168 
The definition of employee would also be limited to individuals currently working 
for the employer, removing existing exclusions for spouses and dependents.169 These 
162. I.R.C. § 262(a) (Westlaw 1988).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (Westlaw 1972).
164. I.R.C. § 132(m)(1).
165. Id.
166. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 1, at 6.
167. See, e.g., Hilary Johnson, Next Hot Industry? Retirement Planning, Inv. News (Jan. 10, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100110/REG/301109994#; Occupational Outlook Handbook: 
Personal Financial Advisors, U.S. Dep’t Lab. Bureau Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-and-
financial/personal-financial-advisors.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (describing the projected growth of 
personal financial advisors as “much faster than average”). Indeed, Kiplinger publishes Retirement 
Report,  a monthly publication that is devoted exclusively to retirement planning. Kiplinger’s Retirement 
Report, Kiplinger, https://www.kiplinger.com/store/krr (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (Westlaw 1985).
169. I.R.C. § 119(a) (Westlaw 1998).
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restrictions reduce the likelihood that employer-provided lodging will simply be 
compensation in disguise.
 What about those art museum directors living in multimillion dollar homes at 
their employer’s expense while not recognizing any economic benefit from these 
arrangements? The museums in question claim that expensive lodging is necessary for 
their directors to entertain guests and receive donations, but it is not clear why lodging 
is required for this important job function. After all, would potential donors not be 
equally inclined to donate to the museum while being feted in the museum that they 
are being asked to support? Such a reasonable, noncompensatory alternative is just as 
viable and likely to be just as effective. Indeed, a 2010 survey by the Association of 
Art Museum Directors found that only 14% of its member organizations offered free 
housing to their executives, and at least one commentator believes that these benefits 
are not eligible for exclusion under the law as it stands today.170 Employer-provided 
lodging for art museum executives should be included in these executives’ gross 
income, absent a very clear showing of business necessity.
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 From the earliest days of the income tax system, Congress and the IRS have 
struggled to create a sensible framework for the treatment of fringe benefits. 
Springing from a natural impulse to not tax employees on economic benefits that 
employers provide for their own business purposes, the development of tax-free 
fringe benefits has metastasized to encompass a wide range of increasingly personal 
services. Indeed, these benefits usually have little, if anything, to do with 
accomplishing the objectives of the employer and everything to do with maximizing 
the potential for tax-free wage substitutes.
 This article advocates a return to first principles to clear out the Augean Stable 
of fringe benefits and confine the scope of tax-free emoluments to those provided by 
employers pursuant to the exigencies and requirements of their business. No longer 
should health insurance, life insurance, employee discounts, airline passes, commuting 
expenses, and retirement planning services receive tax-free treatment simply because 
an employer is the nominal purchaser of items that employees could acquire on their 
own. Under this framework, the IRC would achieve significant simplification and be 
able to start its second century unencumbered by provisions that bedevil rationalization 
and complicate administrability at every turn. In addition, this approach would 
generate substantial revenue, increase fairness between taxpayers, and provide greater 
economic efficiency—a tough combination to beat.
170. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 429, 447–48.
